Abstract. The paper presents a natural application of multi-objective programming to household production and consumption theory. A contribution to multi-objective programming theory is also included.
1. A multi-objective optimization problem. The following multiobjective optimization problem will be considered and applied in the present paper:
Given a k×n matrix A, an m×n matrix C and an m-vector b, we consider the set of all k-vectors of the form Ax for some x ∈ R n + , satisfying the constraint Cx = b; such x's are called solutions of the problem P = (A, C, b). The set of all solutions of P will be denoted by X(P ); it is a convex set. We are specially interested in characterizing the existence of efficient and weakly efficient solutions: a solution x * is called efficient whenever there exists no x ∈ X(P ) for which Ax > Ax * (by y > z we always mean that the respective coordinates of the vector z do not exceed those of y and the vectors are different; y z will mean that all respective coordinates of y are larger than those of z); a solution x * is called weakly efficient whenever there exists no x ∈ X(P ) for which Ax Ax * . Obviously, every efficient solution is also weakly efficient.
Isermann has proven in [2] the following result, actually reducing the problem of finding all efficient solutions to solving a class of linear maximization problems:
* is an efficient solution of a problem P = (A, C, b) if and only if there exists a vector w ∈ R k + , w 0, such that w Ax * ≥ w Ax for all x ∈ X(P ) (i.e. x * maximizes w Ax subject to the constraint Cx = b).
An analogous result holds for weakly efficient solutions: For any solution x, we denote by J(x) the set of those indices j among 1, . . . , k for which there exists no solution y such that Ay > Ax and (Ay) j > (Ax) j .
Theorem 2. A vector x
* is a weakly efficient solution of a problem P = (A, C, b) if and only if there exists a vector w ∈ R k + , w = 0, such that w Ax * ≥ w Ax for all solutions x while w j > 0 if and only if j ∈ J(x * ).
P r o o f. To prove the implication ⇒ suppose first that J(x * ) is empty; then x * is not a weakly efficient solution (by the convexity of X(P )). Now suppose that J(x * ) is not empty and w Ax * ≥ w Ax for all solutions x but x * is not weakly efficient. Then there exists a solution x such that Ax Ax * . But now we have w Ax > w Ax * (w has at least one positive coordinate), which contradicts the hypothesis.
To prove ⇐, we apply Theorem 1 to the matrix A J(x * ) composed of those rows of A whose indices belong to J(x * ). We first show that x * is an efficient solution of the problem (A J(x * ) , C, b).
If x * is efficient for P then J(x * ) = {1, . . . , k}, A J(x * ) = A and the above statement is obviously true. Now let x * be weakly efficient but not efficient for P . For each l ∈ J(x * ) there exists a solution y l such that (Ay
Then z = µ y + (1 − µ)x will be a solution of P such that Az > Ax * and (Az) j > (Ax * ) j for some j ∈ J(x * ), which again contradicts the definition of J(x * ). According to Theorem 1, there exists a positive vector
x for all solutions x. We define a vector w ∈ R k + as follows: w i := v i whenever i ∈ J(x * ) and w i := 0 otherwise. We have
which completes the proof.
One can also easily prove something more:
Proposition 3. If x * is a weakly efficient solution of the problem P = (A, C, b) and w ∈ R k + is such that w Ax * ≥ w Ax for all solutions x then w j = 0 for all j ∈ J(x * ). The model is completely determined by the vectors r i , i = 1, . . . , n, and a distribution d = (d 1 , . . . , d n ), in the (n − 1)-dimensional standard simplex ∆ n , of the respective types in the population.
A model
Once the agents decide which activity to undertake, a distribution of households of type i, producing respective goods, is created: it is a vector
. . , p n ). The volume of the production of the jth good is then equal to
This model has been constructed by Wieczorek in [3] , where the author was interested mainly in the existence and properties of competitive equilibria. In the present paper we are rather interested in the distributions p * leading to supply vectors which are efficient [or weakly efficient] in the sense of Pareto, i.e. p * such that there exists no other distribution p such that
Usually such efficiency concepts are regarded as measuring efficiency of the organization of a society.
We shall prove that p is efficient if and only if there exists a system π = (π 1 , . . . , π k ) of positive prices at which p i maximizes the total profit (of all individuals) of type i, for each i (we speak of the total profit, but it is achieved as a result of decentralized action of the players acting independently and having only their own profit in mind). More precisely, we have:
is Pareto efficient if and only if there exists a system π = (π 1 , . . . , π k ) ∈ ∆ k of positive prices at which p i maximizes the total profit of type i,
, where 1 stands for the n-vector with all entries 1 while C is the n × nk matrix defined by c ij = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n and (i − 1)k + 1 ≤ j ≤ ik; 0 for the remaining pairs (i, j).
Let A be the k × nk matrix defined by
for i = 1, . . . , k and j = (l − 1)k + i (l = 1, . . . , n); 0 for the remaining (i, j).
So we have Ap = S(p) for each p; we have constructed the optimization problem (A, C, 1). According to Theorem 1, a distribution p is an efficient solution of this problem if and only if there exists a vector w ∈ R k + , w 0, such that w Ap ≥ w Aq holds for all q ∈Q. We can normalize w and get a vector π = (π 1 , . . . , π k ) ∈ ∆ k for which the above inequality also holds. The proof will be complete if we show that π is a system of prices we are looking for. This will be formulated as a separate lemma. To prove ⇐, assume that π Ap = max q∈Q π Aq and that there is a type i whose total profit is not maximal. Then there exists a vector
. . , p n ) ∈ Q we have π Aq > π Ap, which contradicts the hypothesis.
An analogue to Theorem 4 for weak efficiency is the following: efficient and (π 1 , . . . , π k ) ∈ ∆ k is any system of prices at which p i maximizes the total profit of type i for each i then, for j = 1, . . . , k, π j = 0 whenever there exists a distribution q such that S(q) > S(p) and (S(q)) j > (S(p)) j .
The results in this section actually describe the process of decentralizing economic behavior of a society: efficient (or weakly efficient) states of an economy are rather obtained in a cooperative manner, an efficient state is jointly elaborated by all agents; in contrast, states at which individuals are maximizing their income have, a fortiori , noncooperative decentralized character. Such "decentralizing" results are known in many economic models for a long time (see e.g. Hildenbrand [1] , p. 232) although the mathematical tools to get them may be entirely different from ours.
